Authored By: Advocate V R Tripathi, LL.B., LL.M.

482 Cr.P.C.

482. Saving of inherent powers of High Court—Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.

The lines of the Section 482 Cr.P.C. starting with Non-Obstante Clause¹. According to Wharton’s Legal Dictionary the Non-Obstante Clause means ‘Notwithstanding’². The Non-Obstante Clause is having overriding effect. The Non-Obstante Clause generally starts with ‘Notwithstanding anything contained in this section’. In the context of ongoing discussion, it means that no section under the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 can affect the ongoing provisions. The Section 482 Cr.P.C. will prevail over other sections of the Code. 

According to Oxford English Dictionary the term inherent means ‘basic or permanent part of something/subject and that cannot be removed’³. According to Merriam-Webster website the term ‘inherent means belonging to basic nature of someone or something’.  The term ‘inherent powers of the High Court’ means that the powers mentioned Under Section 482 are part of the Code which cannot be removed. The Inherent Powers of the High Courts was also provided in the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 under Section 561A.   

The U.S Courts follows Doctrine of Inherent Powers. The Constitution of U.S or any law not provide Inherent Powers of court as provided in Cr.P.C. but the powers exist because courts exist⁴.

The Section 482 Cr.P.C. prescribe following cases under which the High Court can exercise powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C.:

1.    To give effect to any order under the Cr.P.C.

2.    To prevent abuse of the process of any court (means courts subordinate to the High Court)

3.    To secure the ends of Justice

The examples of the inherent powers of the High Courts:

1.    Interim Bail

2.    Protection from coercive action

3.    Quashing of FIR

4.    Staying of Investigation

5.    Any other relief to secure the ends of Justice

The case laws explaining the concept of 482 Cr.P.C.

Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. V. State of Maharashtra and Others⁵ - The appellant herein has lodged an FIR against respondent no. 2 to 4 at Worli Police Station, Mumbai for the offences under Section 406, 420, 465, 468, 471 and 120B of the India Penal Code. The allegations against the original accused pertain to forgery and fabrication of Board Resolution and the fraudulent sale of valuable property Naziribagh Palace ad-measuring 111, 882 sq. ft. belonging to appellant company to one M/s. Irish Hospitality Ltd. Apprehending their arrest in connection with the aforesaid FIR, the original accused filed Anticipatory Bail application before the learned trial Court under Section 438 Cr.P.C. That the learned Sessions Court, Mumbai granted interim protection from arrest to the alleged accused. That the interim protection, which was granted by the learned Sessions Court, was further extended from time to time and continued nearly for a year thereafter. That during the pendency of the anticipatory bail application pending before the learned Sessions Court, Mumbai, original accused – respondent nos. 2 to 4 herein preferred a petition before the High Court of Judicature at Bombay under Article 226 of the Constitution of India r/w Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing the FIR, on 17.09.2020. On 28.10.2020 the High Court has passed the order directing that “no coercive measures shall be adopted against the petitioners (original accused – respondent nos. 2 to 4 herein) in respect of the said FIR”. Dissatisfied with the order the Appellant moved to the Supreme Court.

The Hon’ able Supreme Court have concluded on the principal/core issue, whether the High Court would be justified in passing an interim order of stay of investigation and/or “no coercive steps to be adopted”, during the pendency of the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and in what circumstances and whether the High Court would be justified in passing the order of not to arrest the accused or “no coercive steps to be adopted” during the investigation or till the final report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/disposing of/not entertaining/not quashing the criminal proceedings/complaint/FIR in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, our final conclusions are as under: i) The Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into a cognizable offence; ii) Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizable offences; iii) It is only in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report that the Court will not permit an investigation to go on; iv) The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, as it has been observed, in the ‘rarest of rare cases (not to be confused with the formation in the context of death penalty) v) While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint; vi) Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage; vii) Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception rather than an ordinary rule; viii) Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of activities and one ought not to tread over the other sphere; ix) The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping; x) Save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences; xi) Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice; xii) The first information report is not an encyclopedia which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in progress, the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the investigation. It would be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated or that it amounts to abuse of process of law. After investigation, if the investigating officer finds that there is no substance in the application made by the complainant, the investigating officer may file an appropriate report/summary before the learned Magistrate 60 which may be considered by the learned Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure; xiii) The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide, but conferment of wide power requires the court to be more cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the court; xiv) However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law, more particularly the parameters laid down by this Court in the cases of R.P. Kapur (supra) and Bhajan Lal (supra), has the jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint; xv) When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused and the court when it exercises the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., only has to consider whether the allegations in the FIR disclose commission of a cognizable offence or not. The court is not required to consider on merits whether or not the merits of the allegations make out a cognizable offence and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR; xvi) The aforesaid parameters would be applicable and/or the aforesaid aspects are required to be considered by the High Court while passing an interim order in a quashing petition in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, an interim order of stay of investigation during the pendency of the quashing petition can be passed with circumspection. Such an interim order should not require to be passed routinely, casually and/or mechanically. Normally, when the investigation is in progress and the facts are hazy and the entire evidence/material is not before the High Court, the High Court should restrain itself from passing the interim order of not to arrest or “no coercive steps to be adopted” and the accused should be relegated to apply for anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. before the competent court. The High Court shall not and as such is not justified in passing the order of not to arrest and/or “no coercive steps” either during the investigation or till the investigation is completed and/or till the final report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/disposing of the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. xvii) Even in a case where the High Court is prima facie of the opinion that an exceptional case is made out for grant of interim stay of further investigation, after considering the broad parameters while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India referred to hereinabove, the High Court has to give brief reasons why such an interim order is warranted and/or is required to be passed so that it can demonstrate the application of mind by the Court and the higher forum can consider what was weighed with the High Court while passing such an interim order. xviii) Whenever an interim order is passed by the High Court of “no coercive steps to be adopted” within the aforesaid parameters, the High Court must clarify what does it mean by “no coercive steps to be adopted” as the term “no coercive steps to be adopted” can be said to be too vague and/or broad which can be misunderstood and/or misapplied. 

In Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra⁶ the Supreme Court has held that at the outset the following principles may be noticed in relation to the exercise of the inherent power of the High Court which have been followed ordinarily and generally, almost invariably, barring a few exceptions: -

(1) That the power is not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party;

(2) That it should be exercised very sparingly to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice;

(3) That it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the code.

In State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors.⁷ the Supreme Court has elaborately considered the scope and ambit of Section 482 Cr.P.C. Seven categories of cases have been enumerated where power can be exercised under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. Para 102 thus reads:

“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”

In Sandeep Khaitan, Resolution Professional for National Plywood Industries Ltd.  V. JSVM Plywood Industries Ltd⁸ the Supreme Court held that the power under Section 482 may not be available to the Court to countenance the breach of a statuary provision. The words ‘to secure the ends of justice’ in Section 482 cannot mean to overlook the undermining of a statutory dictate, which in this case is the provisions of Section 14, and Section 17 of the IBC.

Jugesh Sehgal v. Shamsher Singh Gogi⁹ the Supreme Court held that “the inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the High Court to act according to whim or caprice.”

In Simrikhia v. Dolley Mukherjee¹⁰ the Supreme Court held in another context, while holding that the High Court cannot exercise its inherent powers to review its earlier decision in view of Section 362 of the Cr.P.C., observed that the inherent powers of the High Court cannot be invoked to sidestep statutory provisions. This Court held:

“5. …Section 482 enables the High Court to make such order as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The inherent powers, however, as much are controlled by principle and precedent as are its express powers by statute. If a matter is covered by an express letter of law, the court cannot give a go-by to the statutory provisions and instead evolve a new provision in the garb of inherent jurisdiction.”

In Rajeev Kourav v. Baisahab and others¹¹ the Supreme Court held that exercise of power under section 482 to quash a criminal proceeding is only when an allegation made in the FIR or the charge sheet constitutes the ingredients of the offence/offences alleged - Interference by the High Court under Section 482 CrPC is to prevent the abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice - It is settled law that the evidence produced by the accused in his defense cannot be looked into by the Court, except in very exceptional circumstances, at the initial stage of the criminal proceedings - It is trite law that the High Court cannot embark upon the appreciation of evidence while considering the petition filed under Section 482 CrPC for quashing criminal proceedings. It is clear from the law laid down by this Court that if a prima facie case is made out disclosing the ingredients of the offence alleged against the accused, the Court cannot quash a criminal proceeding.

Mahendra KC v. State of Karnataka¹² the Supreme Court has reiterated the well settled test to be applied by the High Court for exercise of its powers under Section 482 for quashing an FIR:

“16…the test to be applied is whether the allegations in the complaint as they stand, without adding or detracting from the complaint, prima facie establish the ingredients of the offence alleged. At this stage, the High Court cannot test the veracity of the allegations nor for that matter can it proceed in the manner that a judge conducting a trial would, on the basis of the evidence collected during the course of trial.”

In Jitul Jentilal Kotecha v. State of Gujarat & Ors.¹³ the High Court quashed the FIR against the persons who were not arraigned as accused in FIR and investigation is still going on. The Supreme Court held that High Court transgressed the limitations on the exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC in quashing the FIR and all consequential proceedings. There has been a clear abuse of the process before the High Court.

M/s. Suvarna Cooperative Bank Limited v. State of Karnataka and others¹⁴ the Supreme Court held that quashing of criminal proceedings merely because some of the persons who might have committed the offences are not charge-sheeted, can not be a ground to quash the proceedings against the accused charge-sheeted after having found prima facie case against him after investigation.

The basic difference between Inherent Powers provided under Civil Procedure Code and Inherent Powers provided in Criminal Procedure Code

The powers under Civil Procedure Code are very wide powers. The powers of Civil Procedure Code not only confined to the High Courts. The District Courts can also use the Inherent Powers provided in Civil Procedure Code while in Criminal Procedure Code the High Court can only use its Inherent Powers. Both sections in C.P.C. as well as Cr.P.C. starts with Non-Obstante Clause. 

1.            Prabhu Chawla v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2016 SC 4254 2.            Wharton Pocket Law Dictionary, Page No. 519 3.            Oxford English Dictionary, Page No 627 4.            Source: Website of U.S Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs 5.            (2020) 10 SCC 118 6.            AIR 1978 SC 47 7.            1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 8.            2021 SCC ONLINE SC 338 9.            (2009) 14 SCC 683 10.         (1990) 2 SCC 437 11.         (2020) AIR (SC) 909 12.         Criminal Appeal No. 1238 of 2021 13.         Criminal Appeal Nos. 1328-1333 of 2021 14.         Criminal Appeal No. 1535 of 2021